The lack of effective of political parties is one of the dominant characteristics of modern Arab polities. The role of opposition to the authoritarian regimes is therefore left to a number of civil society organisations. This study examines the interactions among such groups in the context of the traditional transition paradigm and analyses specifically how religious and secular organisations operate and interact. The empirical evidence shows that such groups, far from attempting any serious coalition building to make common democratising demands on the regime, have a competitive relationship due to their ideological differences and conflicting policy preferences. This strengthens authoritarian rule even in the absence of popular legitimacy. The study focuses its attention on Algeria and Jordan.
Introduction
One of the principal characteristics of the authoritarian political regimes in the Middle East and North Africa is the weakness of established political parties. Even in liberalised autocracies 1 such as Jordan or Morocco, countries with apparently functioning multiparty systems, official political parties, structured similarly to their
Western counterparts, are largely perceived to be ineffective in challenging the authoritarian structure of the state. 2 Some scholars go even further and underline how official opposition movements lack so strongly in autonomy as to form a pillar of the authoritarian regime itself. 3 Thus, in the Middle East and North Africa, it is within the realm of a growing politicised 'civil society' that demands for radical change to the political, economic and social structures in place in the region are articulated. Given the complex relationship between civil society and democratisation, it is important to look at the dynamics that are generated within civil society by the interactions among different opposition associations and groups.
The traditional transition paradigm often underlines the important role of an active civil society in bringing about democratisation, which is at times believed to be a condition sine qua non for the establishment of democratic governance. More recently however such a strong link between democratisation and civil society activism has come under increasing criticism. In addition, the very theoretical usefulness and practical applicability of such a concept to non-Western areas is questioned and this is particularly the case in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In spite of this criticism, this paper contends that the civil society is a useful category to examine neglected social dynamics that allow us to better grasp some of the reasons why democratisation seems not to be occurring. This study, through an indepth examination of two countries, will analyse one very specific aspect of 'civil society': the interactions between liberal/secular and religious organisations involved in the promotion of human rights and democratisation. The nature of such interactions will shed some light on how opposition politics within civil society is structured and the impact it has on the political system.
Civil society, democratisation and the MENA region
Civil society, understood as 'the zone of voluntary associative life beyond family and clan affiliations but separate from the state and the market' 4 , has always played a prominent role in explaining processes of democratisation. This wider debate on civil society has had a significant impact on scholars of the Middle East and North Africa where authoritarian rule is still the norm. With respect to the variable civil society, the absence of democratisation has been then explained in different ways. Those who adopt a positive normative approach to the concept argued for some time that civil society was too weak to have an impact on political change. 10 When empirical evidence was offered that Arab societies were far from being weak and passive 11 , some scholars, adopting a less loaded normative view of the concept, argued that many of the groups belonging to it were authoritarian by nature and therefore unable to promote democratic change. 12 This applies specifically to the dominant role that Islamist movements and associations play in contemporary Arab social life. Other scholars still underline how the growth of civil society does not lead to democratisation because it has no real autonomy from the regimes in place and is therefore unable to perform its primary function. 13 While a more neutral definition of civil society is welcome, this should not obscure the fact that the activism of civil society organisations in authoritarian contexts relies heavily on a discourse that fundamentally opposes the practices of the regimes in power and can therefore be seen as an agent of democratic change, particularly when the language of democracy and rights, however loosely defined, is utilised by the vast majority of the civil society actors involved. In this respect,
Gellner's definition of civil society can apply to the region: 'a cluster of institutions and associations strong enough to prevent tyranny, but which are, nevertheless, entered freely rather than imposed either by birth or by awesome ritual'. 14 As mentioned above, civil society in the region is very active and, as empirical evidence shows 15 , it is not simply a mechanism of social control, but enjoys a considerable degree of autonomy from the regimes. In addition, the presence of Islamism within civil society should not a priori determine its inherent authoritarian nature because, as shown elsewhere, associations and movements cannot simply be labelled authoritarian without examining the context within which they operate, which inevitably constrains their actions and modifies beliefs. 16 John Entelis argues convincingly that 'without a well developed civil society, it is difficult, if not impossible, to have an atmosphere supportive of democracy.' 17 In addition, empirical evidence seems to demonstrate that a weakening of civil society's vibrancy leads to a weakening of trust and interest for democratic engagement even in established democracies such as the United States. 18 The role of civil society deserves therfeore to be analysed in more detail in the Arab world because of the apparent paradox that exists between its inherent strength and its inability to affect regime It is within this active civil society that opposition politics should be examined when it comes to the Arab world.
Opposition dynamics and the transition paradigm
With this in mind, it is time to turn to the empirical examination of the dynamics of civil society and their potential role in democratisation in the region. This can be done through the theoretical framework provided by the transition paradigm.
Its core assumptions have marked the academic world over the last three decades and were very much helpful in modelling the institutional changes taking place throughout the world, as a significant number of countries moved away from authoritarian rule. 20 The idea of dividing the process of transition into different stages that unfold consequentially one from the other has been particularly useful, as it permitted to identify key moments in the transition that would determine its success or failure.
Even more importantly, it permitted to identify the principal actors playing the game outlining their most preferred outcomes, their interests and their perceptions about the game itself and the other players. From this theoretical work, practical advice could be given to those embarking on a transition in order to arrive at a positive outcome. 21 There are three stages identified in the paradigm. The first one is the opening, when the regime, due usually to a crisis that sparks divisions within the ruling elites, imply that there will not be transitions that will fail and that countries would not return to authoritarianism, but the model itself is rather teleological and seems to indicate that it does not really matter how long a country will be stuck at any given stage, it will eventually revert back to move along the path outlined above.
A number of analyses on the Middle East and North African subscribe quite fully to this teleology of democratisation and often emphasise different stages within this process as countries go through certain political and institutional changes. 24 Looking at regime change through the framework of the transition paradigm and its model based on stages also permits scholars to identify actors and examine their interactions, whose actions are confined within the assumptions of the model as well. Thus, the opening always provokes a rift between hard-liners and soft-liners in the regime, with the former fundamentally opposed to any change and the latter believing that only change will allow for the survival of the ruling elite through its participation to the new political institutions. At the same time, the opening makes it possible for the opposition to come out in the pen and begin to organise in order to negotiate with the regime, which still retains the predominant position in the game.
Just as the ruling elites are divided, so is the opposition: there are therefore the moderates and the radicals. In the earlier 'exchanges' of the game between ruling elites and opposition, the interactions between opposition actors are of particular importance because their strength, their choices and their response to the opening will very likely determine how the ruling elite will react and condition whether they will continue with the opening or try to revert back to past practices.
This transition paradigm has recently come under severe and well-deserved criticism with scholars such as Carothers arguing quite convincingly that it should be abandoned because its assumptions are no longer valid in interpreting the current reality. The main problem is that 'no small amount of teleology is implicit in the transition paradigm.' 25 Thus, when we move from the model to the reality what emerges is clearly a different picture and aside from possibly a dozen country that have made a truly complete transition and now enjoy a consolidated democracy, 'by far the majority of the third wave countries have not achieved relatively well functioning democracy or do not seem to be deepening or advancing whatever democratic progress they have made.' 26 Carothers and others are concerned with the picture regarding the transition paradigm and are critical of its teleology and its inability to conceive that transitions are so different as not to be easily submitted to a model that would, more or less, fit them all. In this respect, they are certainly correct and evidence suggests that their criticism is well founded.
Nevertheless, the paradigm might still have some interesting and useful insights to offer, particularly when it comes to interpret transitions as 'games' played by actors and outcome determined by actors' choices. The path, and therefore a foregone conclusion to regime change, might not exist, but it is very difficult to take actors and their interactions out of the picture completely because it is not only structural factors that are at play; agency matters. 27 One important contribution that emerges from the literature on transitions is that at one point in time, for the opening to be temporarily successful, is that the opposition has to be somewhat united and make common demands on the regime. Under any authoritarian regime, many different opposition currents exist, whose political actions and stances are derived from a range of different ideologies and belief systems. The game is indeed played by more than one opposition actor and unity of the opposition only occurs at a time when all the different groups, or at least the vast majority of them representing a large sector of society, pool their resources together to pressurise the regime into making the necessary concessions that will make it possible for them to legitimately compete for power. Once the open competition is guaranteed, the different opposition groups will go their separate ways and compete against each other.
It seems reasonable to hypothesise that all sincere opposition groups in an authoritarian regime suffer from the same constraints on their activities. Their publications are suppressed, members are jailed without trial or harassed, activities (marches, meetings) are either banned or disrupted and, more significantly, political demands for change ignored. It is also legitimate to hypothesise that actors finding themselves in such a situation would attempt to pool their resources in order to achieve what might be the only common goal: the removal of the current regime. In this respect, the ideology they subscribe to, the policy preferences they have and the vision of society they hold should theoretically be put on the backburner in order to America is not different and the Chilean opposition was also able to achieve a degree of unity to remove Pinochet and it brought together a number of different social movements and political actors with very little in common. 30 Following from this, it should be expected that such tendency towards unity despite ideological and policy preferences differences would hold true in all contexts where the authoritarian regime lacks legitimacy, where openings of some sort exist and where opposition actors formally subscribe to a political platform and course of action aimed at regime change. Such conditions are certainly present in the contemporary Arab world as their political development over the last two decades demonstrates. Regimes in the region are largely perceived to be illegitimate by their own population, they have had to undergo a degree of liberalisation due to both domestic and international pressures and all opposition actors formally utilise the language of democracy, accountability and human rights to make demands for change. It is therefore expected that the empirical evidence would show that such coalition building is occurring and that formal co-operation does indeed take place between the different opposition groups within civil society.
The findings: Algeria and Jordan
When it comes to analysing how civil society groups preoccupied with issues of human rights and democratisation operate in the MENA region there are, broadly speaking, two patterns that can be identified in the interactions between religious and secular groups. The first pattern of interaction is one that can be labelled 'cooperative.' On a number of local and limited issues or on a case-by-case basis or on a set time scale, there is a certain degree of convergence and informal co-operation between secular and religious NGOs. If the issue at stake can be considered to a certain extent self-contained and one with which the regime itself feels reasonably comfortable dealing with, both religious and secular NGOs are capable of finding a common, if often informal, strategy of action. This has been the case of the informal common front against torture that characterised the relationship of liberal Moroccan associations for human rights and semi-legal Islamist groups such as the Justice and
Charity Group. 31 The unity of intent between Islamists and secular liberal groups does not however tend to spill over to other more significant and potentially more disruptive issues for the regime. This pattern of co-operation usually leads the regime to 'give in' on the matter, recognising the validity of the stance taken by civil society.
The regime therefore seems to be confident that linkages and spill over will not occur. Algerian League for human rights (LADDH) was for instance scathing in its rejection of the national reconciliation plan in so far as it gives amnesty to people who are responsible for crimes against humanity, which is in fact a crime that cannot be proscribed.
This is in stark contrast to the experience of both Eastern Europe and Latin
While a certain rapprochement has taken place on very specific issues, secular and Islamist associations are still very much divided when it comes to push for more significant and sweeping democratic changes because, despite utilising the language of democracy and human rights, they fundamentally disagree on what the future Algeria should look like. Thus, there is an unwillingness and an inability to form umbrella organizations that would be much stronger, and vocal in pushing for radical change. Thus, the Algerian regime can play the opposition actors within civil society against each other.
The interesting findings about Algeria are quite at odds with the expected outcomes not only when it comes to the recent period, but also when one looks at past events dating back to the attempted democratization of the late 1980s and early 1990s. 34 The end of the democratising process for instance took place with the support and, some argue, at the demand of a number of secular groups that did not want the Islamic Front in power. The very idea that political and human rights associations committed to democracy and very much involved in demanding political change would prefer the re-instauration of an authoritarian regime rather than seeing another opposition movement come to power was certainly not conceived of by those working on the transition paradigm.
In is phenomenally endemic in Jordanian politics, especially within influential circles in the government, should be a priority to deal with, as agreed by all opposition groups.' 37 Thus, on this issue there seems to be widespread agreement and all movements also concur on the responsibility that the King has in this. It follows that there is quite a considerable pressure on the regime to act on this specific issue, but the outcome is never serious political reforms, but simply the dismissal of officials that are named and shamed, while the practice as a whole, which is the inevitable result of an authoritarian system, never disappears.
Such an informal alliance against corruption is however never taken to a higher level of formality to demand much deeper changes. Each side, once obtained a significant result on a single issue, retreats to the safety of their respective ideological position and continues on a pattern of competition.
In fact, in both countries the competitive pattern is much stronger and is the dominant trait of their interactions. In Algeria, the competitive pattern is much more important than the co-operative one. This is partly due to the legacy of the civil war that pitted Islamist insurgents against a supposedly secular regime, but to hold the civil war solely responsible for the prevalence of the competitive behaviour would be In Jordan the competitive pattern is also dominant, even though less intense.
The Secretary General of Islamic Action Front Zaki Bani Ershaid would be formally in favour of building alliances with secular groups, but he had this to say about them:
'secular groups are fragmented forces, unstable, because they move from power to opposition without sticking to clear principles. In other words they are governed by short-term vision in order to achieve power and financial gains. This is however no longer so much the case, particularly because of increased Islamist radicalism in the country and the royal family seems to count much more strongly on the support of secular and liberal groups for its own survival. This occurs even though, at least nominally, all groups, both religious and secular, defend the cause of democracy, accountability, and human rights. A further paradox is that the so-called democratic elements within Arab societies are the strongest advocates of dictatorship
for fear that what they perceive to be totalitarian movements would seize power through the ballot box. In all of this, the Islamists sound most reasonable and coherent when they argue that the democratic will of the people should adjudicate on whom has the right to rule.
Conclusion
The absence of meaningful and successful processes of democratisation in the There are also foreign policy implications from these findings, which should lead policy-makers, if serious about democratisation in the region, to work in favour of building bridges between religious and secular groups to form a coalition capable of removing the current authoritarian leaders without having the country descending into anarchy. Current policy choices do not seem to go in that direction and advice to policy-makers either. 45 
